Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Roy Wirth : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; William K. McGuire;
Deputy Davis County Attorney; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Christopher L. Shaw; Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Wirth, No. 950039 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6400

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 950039-CA

ROY WIRTH,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
(METHAMPHETAMINE), A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS
COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE,
PRESIDING.

UTAH C
UTAH
DOCL
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

EALS

Qj^ao^

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
WILLIAM K. MCGUIRE
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant
Oral Argument Not Requested

FILED
MAY 181995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 950039-CA

ROY WIRTH,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
(METHAMPHETAMINE), A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (1994), IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS
COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE,
PRESIDING.
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
WILLIAM K. MCGUIRE
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant
Oral Argument Not Requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BACKPACK WAS
INCIDENT TO HIS LAWFUL ARREST
ALTERNATIVELY, THE ADMISSION OF THE
METHAMPHETAMINE SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER
THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE

CONCLUSION

5

10
13

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Trial Court's Oral Ruling on Motion
to Suppress
Addendum B - Trial Court's Written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
6, 7

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752 (1969)

5,

6,

8,

Illinois v. Lafayette. 462 U.S. 640 (1983)

9
11

New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981)

6

Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431 (1984)

10

State v. Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied.
773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)

7

State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986)

7

State v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68 (Utah App. 1989)

5

State v. Geer. 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied.
773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)

11

State v. Hansen. 837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992)

2, 10

State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)

5

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)

6

State v. Houser. 669 P.2d 437 (Utah 1983)

7

State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988)

10

State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied,
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)

10, 12

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

1

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied.
817 P.2d 327 (1991), cert, denied. 503 U.S. 914 (1992) . . . .
State v. Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

ii

11
11
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994)

1,

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1994)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1994)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1994)

2, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994)

iii

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
V,

:

Case No. 950039-CA

ROY WIRTH,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one
count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2) (a) (i) (1994).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that defendant's

backpack was searched incident to his lawful arrest?
Whether
constituted

the

officer's

a proper

search

search

of

incident

defendant's
to

arrest

backpack

is a

legal

conclusion, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271
(Utah 1993) .
2.

In any event, would the inevitable discovery doctrine

justify admission of the evidence found in defendant's backpack
following his lawful arrest?

Although inevitable discovery was not argued in the trial
court, this Court "can affirm the trial court on any proper legal
ground."

State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
will be included in the body of the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Five charges were brought against defendant: two counts of
possession of controlled substances (methamphetamine and LSD), both
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2) (a) (i) (1994); one count of assault on a police officer, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4
(1994); one count of interference with an arresting officer, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-3 05
(1994) ; and one count of disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1994) (R. 18-20).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his
backpack on the grounds that the police officers exceeded the
limits of a search incident to arrest and that the search could not
otherwise be justified as an inventory search (R. 26-33) . After a
hearing, the court denied the motion (R. 77-79).

Pursuant to a

plea agreement, defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea
of guilty to the charges of possession of methamphetamine and
interfering with arrest or detention (R. 85-88) .
this timely appeal (R. 95).

2

He then filed

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Early

on

June

27, 1994, Officer

Jim

Kortright

of

the

Clearfield City police department was dispatched to investigate a
report of a suspicious male (R. 109-110).

He found defendant

"walking up and down the north side of the street swaying his arms
about and yelling"

(R. 110) .

When asked what he was doing,

defendant responded that he was singing.

He sat down on the

ground, removed a harmonica from his backpack, played a few notes,
and put it away (R. Ill) .

Defendant then removed a decorative,

sheathed Middle Eastern dagger from the backpack. When he began to
remove the knife from the sheath to show Officer Kortright and
another officer who had arrived on the scene, the officers told him
to put it back (R. 112) . After defendant did so, Kortright advised
him to "pick up all of his stuff, head for the bus stop and go back
home into Ogden" (Id.) .

Defendant headed for the bus stop, and

Kortright went back to the office (Id.).
About half an hour later, Kortright returned to the scene to
check on whether defendant had boarded his bus (R. 113). Kortright
saw defendant in the middle of the road, and "was advised by a
citizen, a female, that he had been pounding on windows of cars and
saying things like 'bless you'" (Id.).

Kortright called defendant

over to him, and defendant complied (R. 114, 121) . Kortright then
told defendant to put his arms behind his back for a disorderly
conduct arrest (R. 114). Defendant did not comply.
Instead, defendant "came at" Kortright (R. 114). At the same
time, Kortright's dog escaped from the patrol car, requiring some
3

attention,

and

Kortright

made

a

numchucks to defendant's wrist.

failed

attempt

at

applying

Ultimately, with help from two

passing citizens, Kortright tackled defendant and held him in a
bear hug until other officers arrived (R. 52, 114-15).

Once the

arrest was finally made, defendant was placed in a patrol car (R.
116, 124) . At that point, Kortright told his fellow officers that
the backpack by the bus stop, some 10 to 15 feet away, belonged to
defendant and that it contained a dagger (R. 116, 123) . One of the
officers went through the backpack and discovered, along with the
dagger and various other personal items, methamphetamine and LSD in
the pocket of a pair of pants (R. 117) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly determined

that the search of

defendant's backpack, some 10 to 15 feet away from defendant at the
time he physically resisted arrest, was a lawful search incident to
arrest.

Defendant argues that the search was beyond the scope of

this exception to the warrant requirement, improperly focusing on
the static post-arrest scenario, when defendant was handcuffed,
shackled, and secured in a police car.
focus,

however,

should

be

on

the

The proper analytical

circumstances

immediately

surrounding the arrest, which were marked by defendant "coming at"
the officer, and the officer ultimately subduing defendant, with
citizen help, on the ground in a bear hug until further police help
arrived. Because the backpack, which the officer knew contained a
weapon, was within defendant's area of immediate control at the
time of the arrest, the officers lawfully searched it incident to
4

defendant's arrest.
Alternatively, the contraband found in defendant's backpack
would have inevitably been discovered once defendant was booked
into jail following his arrest.

The arresting officer testified

that the jail followed a routine inventory procedure which would
include a complete written record of the contents of defendant's
backpack.
immediately

Thus, even if the backpack had not been searched
following defendant's arrest, it would have been

subject to a complete inventory at the jail which would have
revealed the contraband defendant now seeks to have suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
BACKPACK WAS INCIDENT TO HIS LAWFUL
ARREST
A search incident to arrest is one exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement.

The United States Supreme Court

has established the parameters of this exception.1

A warrantless

search of both an arrestee and the area "within his immediate
control" are permissible for the limited purposes of preventing the
arrestee from gaining control over a weapon or from destroying
evidence of a crime.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763

(1969); accord State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983).
1

Defendant states that the protection afforded an arrestee
under the Utah Constitution may be greater than under the United
States Constitution. See Br. of App. at 6. Because defendant
fails to develop an argument addressing the distinction, however,
this analysis proceeds under federal law. See, e.g., State v.
Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah App. 1989).
5

The crux of defendant's argument is that the officers' search
of his backpack fell outside the ambit of this exception (Br. of
App.

at 11-12) .

The backpack was 10 to 15 feet away from

defendant, five officers were present, and defendant was shackled,
in handcuffs, and seated in a police car at the time of the search.
In defendant's view, the backpack was thus not
immediate control."

"within his

Therefore, defendant concludes, the officers

should have obtained a warrant before searching it.
Defendant's argument fails because he has mistakenly focused
on the static post-arrest tableau rather than on the unpredictable
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest.
The United States Supreme Court has construed the phrase
"within his immediate control" in the context of a search incident
to arrest to mean "the area from within which [a suspect] might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."

Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. at 763. When an automobile stop is involved,
the area of immediate control "can extend to a closed container
left in the passenger area of a car, even after the arrestee has
been moved away from the car."

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769,

784 (Utah App. 1991) (citing New York v. Bel ton. 453 U.S. 454, 461
(1981)),

cert, denied, 817 P.2d

327

(Utah 1991).

The same

interpretation applies to situations in which an automobile is not
involved.

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a), at 534

(1987) (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)); see also
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-85 (Utah App. 1991) (search of
diaper bag in stroller 10 feet away from defendant at time of
6

arrest permissible); State v. Houser, 669 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1983)
(search of arrestee's backpack permissible).

In essence, every

person arrested is viewed "as a combination acrobat and Houdini who
might well free himself from his restraints and suddenly gain
access to some distant place."
Seizure

§ 6.3(c),

underpinning

for

at
the

628

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and

(1987).

search

Because

incident

to

the

theoretical

arrest

exception

encompasses the fluid circumstances potentially accompanying any
arrest, it makes no analytical difference whether the search occurs
before or after the arrest, as long as the two events are basically
contemporaneous. See, e.g., State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-12
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); State v.
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986).
In this case, defendant's backpack was within his area of
immediate control, as courts have defined that term.

When the*

physical confrontation with Officer Kortright began, defendant was
about five steps away from his pack (R. 123). Defendant had just
"come

at" Kortright.

By

his

own

admission,

Kortright

was

struggling for control of the situation, evidenced by his testimony
that he was distracted by his escaping dog, he was unable to apply
his numchucks effectively, and he needed help from two passing
citizens to subdue and control defendant (R. 52, 114-15, 124) .
Certainly, at that juncture, defendant could have reached his
backpack.

And, had defendant physically prevailed, he could have

gained possession of his knife, plainly a weapon.

Thus, for

purposes of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
7

requirement,

defendant's

backpack

was

"within

his

immediate

control."
Defendant also asserts that the search was improper because
there was no realistic possibility that he could injure the
officers with the contents of his backpack or destroy any of its
contents

(Br. of App. at 7-10) .

This argument, however, is

identical to his argument that the backpack was not within his
immediate control.

Chimel's definition of immediate control is

"the area from within which [a suspect] might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California, 3 95 U.S. at
763. Thus, definitionally, if the backpack was within defendant's
immediate control, it was also in a place where he could retrieve
a weapon or destroy evidence.
Finally, defendant objects to the trial court's "theoretical"
rather than "practical" analysis of search incident to arrest. He
argues that a "theoretical" analysis has "no limit at all" because,
theoretically, "anything is possible" (Br. of App. at 13-14) . In
context, however, the trial court's oral ruling

reflects an

accurate understanding of search incident to arrest.
stated:
Both counsel adequately argue the point that
the theory behind the search incident to
arrest is based on the philosophy that [it] is
conducted to protect police or public or
prevent loss of evidence. . . .[T]he analysis
is one from a theoretical standpoint, not from
a practical standpoint.
The issue becomes
what were the circumstances immediately at the
time of the arrest, not 10 minutes later when
the defendant maybe was in custody and
shackled, but what were the circumstances
immediately at the time of arrest.
8

The court

The Court would find that from a theoretical
standpoint, there could have been a weapon in
that bag that could have theoretically been
obtained by the defendant or theoretically
could have been obtained by some third person
to the injury of the public, and for that
reason, the Court would find that the officers
in conducting the search in the manner in
which it was conducted in such close proximity
to the defendant was concurrent with the
arrest and was properly executing a search
incident to an arrest.
R. 152-53 or addendum A.
The clear import of the trial court's ruling is that a search
incident to arrest must be analyzed from the perspective of the
officers

at

the

time

of

the

arrest, rather

than

from

the

comfortable vantage point of hindsight, as defendant would prefer.
In Chimel, the United States Supreme Court stated:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to
resist
arrest
or
effect
his
escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And
the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items
must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
Chimel

v.

California,

395 U.S. at

762-63

Plainly, the trial court's use of the word

(emphasis

added).

"theoretical" is

consistent with the Supreme Court's use of the word "might." Both
reflect the reality that circumstances surrounding an arrest can
change quickly, and that officers must take the unknown into
account as they proceed through an arrest. Defendant's preference
9

for a "practical" approach--meaning an outcome-based analysis-simply has no support in the law.
Because the trial court properly determined that defendant was
searched incident to his arrest and because, in any case, the
officer's

testimony

established

that

the

contraband

would

inevitably have been discovered at the jail, this Court should
uphold the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his
conviction.
POINT TWO
ALTERNATIVELY, THE ADMISSION OF THE
METHAMPHETAMINE SHOULD BE UPHELD
UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE.
If this Court determines that the search of defendant's
backpack was not a proper search incident to arrest, it should
nonetheless uphold the admission of the methamphetamine under the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, because an
inventory search conducted when defendant arrived at the jail would
have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the contraband.2
The

inevitable

discovery

rule

is

an

exception

to

the

exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and recognized in Utah in State
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988); see also State v.
Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1990) (noting recognition of
inevitable discovery rule in Northrup), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241

2

Although inevitable discovery was not argued at the
suppression hearing, this Court "can affirm the trial court on any
proper legal ground." State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah
App. 1992).
10

(Utah 1991).

"The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission

of evidence as long as

'the prosecution can establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means./fI State v.
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 n.19 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. at 444), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (1991),
cert, denied 503 U.S. 914 (1992).
Defendant here does not claim that his arrest was invalid. He
argues only that the on-the-scene search of his backpack was not a
lawful

search

incident

to arrest.

Defendant

has failed to

recognize, however, that his backpack would have nevertheless been
later subject to an inventory search as a standard part of the
arrest procedure.
An inventory search may be performed on "any container or
article in an arrested person's possession as part of established
inventory procedures incident to incarcerating an arrested person."
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983)), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1989) ; see also State v. Stricklina, 844 P.2d 979, 988 (Utah
App. 1992).

As a result of defendant's lawful arrest, his

backpack--known by the police both to be his and to contain a
weapon--could not be left at the bus stop but would have to be
taken to jail with him (R. 111-12, 116) .

The backpack would,

therefore, have been subject to an inventory search at the jail,
which would have disclosed the contraband.
The record supports this conclusion.
11

Officer Kortright

testified that the jail's inventory procedure would cover "the
total contents" of defendant's backpack and that jail personnel
would maintain a written inventory of the items turned over to them
(R. 127, 129, 134). Kortright's testimony showed it was standard
procedure for the arresting officer to make a list of any items
removed from the arrestee, and then to turn the property over to
the jail for a complete inventory of any items not removed (R. 127,
128-29).

This testimony provides sufficient record evidence for

the Court to determine that the inevitable discovery rule has been
satisfied.

Cf. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Utah App.

1990) (remanding for factual findings on inevitable discovery of
ring that suspect swallowed, where issue was considered for first
time on appeal and record contained no evidence relevant to
inevitable discovery).
Thus, even if the backpack had not been searched immediately
following defendant's arrest, it would still have been subject to
a complete inventory when it arrived at the jail with defendant
following his booking.
than

not

have

That lawful inventory would more likely

disclosed

the

contraband,

which

admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.

12

is

therefore

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /p day of May, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
kttorrvey General

C

JfrfkJt^

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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prepaid, to Christopher L. Shaw, Attorney for Defendant, Gridley,
Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw, 635 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401,
this J8i

day of May, 1995
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

T r i a l C o u r t ' s Oral Ruling
On Motion t o Suppress

basis.
THE COURT:
MR. SHAW:
THE COURT:
this matter.

Mr. Shaw, anything further?
No, your Honor.
The Court will rule as follows in

First of all, it's clear to the Court that both

of the parties concede that the arrest was made with probable
cause and was appropriate.

I have heard no other argument

otherwise in this matter.
The next question turns to the appropriateness of
the search that occurred in this matter.

There is no

question that under the law, the Fourth Amendment and Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution precludes
warrant searches in only a few accepted circumstances, one of
those being incident to a lawful arrest.

As I've indicated

there was no intention that the arrest was not lawful in this
matter.

So the question becomes whether or not this search

was appropriate under the provisions of an arrest incident or
a search incident to arrest.
Both counsel adequately argue the point that the
theory behind the search incident to arrest is based on the
philosophy that is conducted to protect police or public or
prevent loss of evidence.

I would note that I see no

appreciable difference in the rationale behind a search
incident to an arrest between that of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the

47

Utah State Constitution.

And in all of those cases, the

analysis is one from a theoretical standpoint, not from a
practical standpoint.

The issue becomes what were the

circumstances immediately at the time of the arrest, not 10
minutes later when the defendant maybe was in custody and
shackled, but what were the circumstances immediately at the
time of the arrest.
In the matter here before the Court, at the time
of the arrest, the backpack was 10 to 15 feet away from the
defendant.
knife.

The backpack was known to contain at least a

The backpack was in a public area on a public street,

and based upon those circumstances, the Court would find that
since the search was incident to the arrest, essentially in
this case it was concurrent with the arrest.
The Court would find that from a theoretical
standpoint, there could have been a weapon in that bag that
could have theoretically been obtained by the defendant or
theoretically could have been obtained by some third person
to the injury of the public, and for that reason, the Court
would find that the officers in conducting the search in the
manner in which it was conducted in such close proximity to
the defendant was concurrent with the arrest and was properly
executing a search incident to an arrest..
The Court does not find that this is an inventory
search.

First of all, the theory behind inventory searches

48

is basically it's done to protect the agency from civil
liability for items which may have been confiscated and later
found to be missing.

Any inventory search that the officers

conduct, in this particular case, if that's their policy,
does not meet that rationale.

What may have been of value in

their estimation may not be in the defendant's or vice versa.
So I don't think this case can be argued on the basis of an
inventory search.
The Court further finds that the evidence is
uncontroverted that the backpack was taken into custody at
the time of the arrest and was ultimately delivered to the
Davis County Sheriff's Department concurrent with the
delivery of the defendant.

So the Court hinges its decision

on the theory behind the arrest search incident to a valid
arrest.

The Court therefore denies the defendant's motion to

suppress.
I will ask, Mr. McGuire, you prepare findings and
judgment in accordance with my ruling and submit it to
Mr. Shaw for review, and make sure it has in it the facts he
has that he desires, for whatever value it might have in the
future.
(Whereupon other matters were held.)
* * * * *
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ADDENDUM B
Trial Court's Written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order
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William K. McGuire #2192
Davis County Attorney's Office
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JlWlCgg^WJgBIHlCT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

:

THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ROY P. WIRTH,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 941700541

: Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge

This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled
court on November 23, 1994.

The defendant was present with his

attorney, Christopher Shaw, the State was present and represented
by William K. McGuire, Deputy Davis County Attorney, the Honorable
Rodney S. Page, presided.
The Court after having heard evidence presented and
reviewing memoranda submitted by the parties, hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 27, 1994, the defendant was arrested for

disorderly conduct as a result of his impeding traffic.
2.

At the time of his arrest defendant's backpack was

sitting approximately 10-15 feet away from him.
3.

The arresting officer, Jim Kortright of Clearfield

Police Department, had previously seen a knife in the backpack.

The backpack was retrieved at the time of the arrest and was
searched.
4.

During

the

search

xnethamphetamine and LSD were located.

of

the

backpack

some

The knife was also located

in the backpack.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
2.

The arrest of the defendant was a valid arrest.
The question of whether a search is incident to

arrest is the same under both the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution
rationale

since there is no appreciable difference in the

behind

a

search

incident

to

arrest

in

those

two

provisions.
3.
to arrest.

The seizure and search of the backpack was incident
The backpack was open and available to not only the

defendant but potentially to a third person which could cause
damage or injuiry to the public. Based upon the proximity and time
and location to the defendant and his arrest, the search was
therefore incident to arrest.
The Court having

entered

its Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, it now enters the following:
ORDER
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied.

